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Education, philosophy and political economy are all old-fashioned words, 
and I will use them in an old-fashioned manner. They have deep roots in 
European life leading back to Greek antiquity even though the Greeks 
clearly separated politics and economics (Murphy, 2001). Education and 
philosophy, as forms of inquiry, had their beginnings in Ancient Greece. 
They were a central part of a world that was reflective. The philosopher 
reflected on the nature of things. Education ultimately led to philosophy. It 
was a type of preparation for systematic reflection. Politics had an 
ambiguous relation to both philosophy and education. Aristotle wondered 
aloud whether the good life was the theoretical life of the mind or whether 
it was the public life of the polis. The philosopher engaged in the life of the 
mind. The citizen pursued the life of the city. Philosophers were citizens 
but not all citizens were philosophers and not all philosophers were 
citizens. Neither the citizens nor the philosophers had a high opinion of 
economics. Economics was a function of the household. The domain of the 
household was dominated by the activities of freemen, women and slaves.  
It was the modern Enlightenment and the denizens of the nineteenth 
century who combined politics and economics into political economy. This 
laid the foundation for the world that we know and inhabit. The creative 
merger of economics and politics into the juggernaut of political economy 
re-shaped so much of modern social life and in doing so separated us in 
certain crucial ways from antiquity. Thus when the denizens of the West 
look at Greek antiquity today they see something that is both familiar and 
unfamiliar. Likely this is also true of Chinese and Indians who increasingly 
have to negotiate between their own variants of capitalism and their 
philosophical heritage in the past. This is no easy negotiation. 
 
Westerners recognise in classical Greek antiquity the life of the mind 
and the life of the citizen. These are not alien to us. We also have no 
difficulty understanding a world in which education was a systematic 
preparation for philosophy and also at times a useful preparation for 
citizenship. Today we still have citizens and thinkers. Yet much separates 
us from the antique ethos. In 1800 this was less so. Two centuries later, the 
separation has grown. The Victorians could pretend to be Greeks. We 
can’t. We can’t do this convincingly because of what the Victorians did. 
They embraced political economy whole-heartedly. Along with political 
economy came the twin forces of industrialism and capitalism. And with 
modern capitalism came the emancipation of economics from the 
household. This emancipation took time. Once it had happened political 
economy emerged ascendant. 
When economic wealth stopped being the concern alone of the 
household, it became the concern of the nation. Today two things matter 
most in politics: economic growth and warfare. Everything else is 
secondary. As political economy developed and matured, economic growth 
became an object of politics. Successful polities were increasingly defined 
by economic growth. The Victorians at least reconciled the propulsive 
invention of political economy with a profound fascination with classical 
antiquity. Britain’s industry co-existed in interesting ways with the classics. 
But those who came afterwards could not manage the same artful 
reconciliation. It faded away. 
As a consequence, education, philosophy and politics gradually began 
to lose their old-fashioned meaning. The words remained in use but their 
significance changed. Education eventually became a species of learning. 
The person who learnt acquired useful skills and knowledge for show. 
Education became less and less a discipline in thinking. Thinking requires a 
pause in acting. “Think before you act” had been the clarion call. The 
sculptor Rodin captured the spirit of the thinker well. The thinker is 
detached from action. He sits in communion with his own thoughts. Others 
avoid disturbing him. It is not that the thinker is disinterested in the world. 
Rather in thought the world is re-presented. It lives a double life in thought 
(Murphy, 2009). This provides an advantage. In our mind, to a degree, we 
can play with the world. We can try out possibilities, project consequences, 
and re-play the past in different ways. Above all, we can engage in the act 
of imagination. We do this by super-imposing one aspect of the world on 
another. We look at a tree and in our mind we see a family’s genealogy. 
The outcome of the Korean War is a classic story of the imagination at 
work. In December 1950, American forces in Korea were in retreat. The 
rapidly advancing Chinese army was driving the American Eighth Army 
from the Korean Peninsula. Matthew Ridgway was then given command of 
the American forces. The Communist military feat had been rapid. 
Ridgway recognized that China’s success however could also prove to be 
the eventual cause of its failure. He was a military thinker. The rapidity of 
the Chinese advance meant that the Chinese army supply lines were over-
extended. Ridgway chose to exploit this with a vigorous counter-attack. He 
drove the Chinese army back to the 38
th
 parallel. 
Everyone looks but the thinker observes. The theoria of the classical 
philosopher derived from the word for observing. The thinker sees what 
others do not. In thinking, the world is duplicated in the mind. It is 
replicated so that it may be experimented with. Many of the most powerful 
science experiments have been thought experiments. Witness the case of 
Newton. Knowledge tells us what is. Thought tells us what if. The most 
powerful thought tells us what if we treat one thing (x) as if it was another 
thing (y).  
Let us begin with a simple observation. A viewer observes that the 
velocity of a falling apple increases as it drops towards the earth. There 
must be a force that causes this acceleration. Let us call this force 
“gravity”. So far we have observed and reasoned. But let us up-the-ante 
and introduce a metaphor. This profoundly changes the nature of 
observation. What if we treat the apple as if it was an orb. Metaphor is the 
basis of thinking. The thinker (Newton in this case) draws an analogy 
between the farmyard apple and a heavenly body. This then allows reason 
to suppose that the force of “gravity” affects the motion of planets and 
moons. Gravity pulls the falling apple-orb (the moon) toward the earth. But 
as it happens, in the case of the moon, this fall is equal to the curvature of 
the earth, so the moon remains in orbit around the earth. Newton worked 
this out using a thought experiment that compared the moon with a cannon 
ball shot from the earth. A cannon ball that gained sufficient velocity, he 
reasoned, would orbit the earth rather than fall to earth.  
That is great science. It requires thinking. The core of thinking is 
metaphor. The metaphors of the imagination are followed by reasoning that 
draws out the implications of the metaphors. A child may be taught all sorts 
of things about gravitation. A contemporary child who learns about 
gravitation acquires subject knowledge. That is a key part of any education. 
However the same child is not necessarily being pushed to think. Thinking 
is what Newton did. He was armed with knowledge but that knowledge 
was not a sufficient condition to generate new and enduring knowledge. 
This applies not just to the commanding heights of science. It also applies 
in everyday life. Every-time we successfully solve a tricky everyday life 
problem or we confront some testing work issue, we are forced to think. 
We are forced outside of the bounds of what is already known into 
unknown terrain where we have to think analogically.        
 There are the dreamy kids in class who drift off into thought. The 
teacher’s voice recedes into the distance. Their mind wanders. The thinking 
process meanders from idea to idea, wondering, playing, imagining, trying 
to figure out problems by thinking what if A was X. The teacher looks 
impatiently at the child. The child is not learning. The dreamy child is 
annoying. The child who thinks reminds us of the philosopher. The 
philosopher falls into potholes because he is too preoccupied with 
thinking—poor Thales. “Pay attention philosopher” we say. “Pay attention 
child” demands the modern teacher in the class-room. Not so the old-
fashioned educator. The educator happily educates thinkers. The teacher in 
the modern sense tests children for knowledge—not for thinking. 
Knowledge and thinking are not the same.  
Knowledge is acquired. It is uploaded and downloaded, filed and 
retrieved. Its model is the Library of Alexandria. In contrast thinking is a 
kind of work. It is what the Greeks called an energeia, ἐνέργεια, a working 
or activity. Thinking is an energetic, tiring activity. Often it is very 
physical. Sometimes we sweat when we think. This is because thinking is 
difficult. We think with our whole being. It pushes us to our limits. It is 
tough. Because thinking is strenuous, it requires character. Thinkers, 
creators and problem-solvers are people who are persistent and who work 
very hard.  
Hard work and persistence is a function of character. Traditional 
education forms character (Lipman, 2013). Such education is demanding 
and unsentimental. It requires practice and drill. This begins in subjects and 
ends in thinking. The very long hours spent mastering a subject in high 
school is the preparation for the very long hours spent creatively mastering 
problems in higher domains. Creation requires the psychological capacity 
to try, try and try again. It is a slow and painful process. It unfolds over the 
medium and long term as thinkers experiment with this, that and another 
solution to a problem until one is found. This usually takes a long time, and 
creators need the wherewithal to cope with disappointment, failure and 
rebuttal. Contemporary schooling offers virtually no character training.  
Today’s high school students are addicted to social media that 
encourages in them massive anxieties. They are terrified that their peers 
with not respond to them instantly or “like” them. These anxieties will 
eventually crush creation, because creation is a process that is gruelling, 
tiring and testing. Contemporary schools provide almost no character 
formation. It is old-fashioned. It has been replaced by a sentimental regime 
that is hostile to the toughness, demandingness, courage, resilience, and 
intense work ethics required for success. It encourages instead obsessive 
communication about vacuous matters and collaboration that is driven by 
narcissistic urges to be liked by everyone. This is the outcome of a long 
historical shift that begins in the late nineteenth century with the 
appearance of various progressive-liberal movements and that accelerates 
after 1970 as these movements hit their stride.  
The defenestration of the traditional approach to education has had 
serious implications not just for education but also for political economy. 
Education proper is an education in thinking. It intensifies the human 
capacity to intuit, reason, and imagine. Just as over the long run politics 
and economics combined into political economy, education turned its focus 
toward learning and away from thinking. This did not happen over-night. It 
was a slow process. This process though began to accelerate after 1970. As 
industrial societies became post-industrial societies, learning was boosted. 
Learning became a major industry in the post-industrial era. This looked at 
first glance like a recipe for growth in societies in which classic 
manufacturing industries were shrinking. But in fact over the course of the 
forty years of the post-industrial era, this shift detracted from (rather than 
advanced) economic growth, the great measure of the modern age of 
political economy.  
Learning often offers less than it appears to. A learner can learn to think 
but today much more likely a learner learns by acquiring knowledge. We 
all need knowledge. It is a good thing. But knowledge is not thinking. It is 
perfectly possible for a knowledge society or an information society to be 
awash with knowledge and data—and yet for there to be very little thinking 
going on in that society. Indeed in the post-modern age, after the 1970s, a 
whole social class emerged that defined itself by its knowledge 
qualifications. It thought itself to be very smart. But smartness defined by 
knowledge is shallow. Smartness gave itself a bad reputation in the age of 
qualifications.  
Learning involves acquiring not producing. That is its Achilles heel. In 
contrast, thinking is productive. It is the root of all high-level making. 
Thinking produces knowledge and much else besides including techniques, 
designs, actions, plans, and so on. Thinking is the intersection of reason 
and imagination. It begins in intuition and imagination, and it is aided and 
extrapolated by reason. The great flaw of the post-industrial knowledge age 
was that its productive edge declined. The zenith of modern productive 
power was the period between 1945 and 1965. Human per capita 
productivity, economic growth and real income growth reached a high at 
that historic point. After 1970, it ebbed. The political economy of post-
industrial societies was a relative failure (Murphy, 2012). It promised more 
than it delivered.      
 
The combining of politics and economics to create political economy 
was the work of the Enlightenment. This creative combination took-off 
after the Industrial Revolution. Following 1820 it set in train cycles of 
economic growth that have no parallel in human history. This happened 
because the fruit of human ingenuity began to be rapidly translated into 
economic wealth and social prosperity. Science was translated into 
technology, art into design, and social science into industrial organisation. 
Education on the other hand was translated into learning. This hindered 
rather than helped political economy. The political economy of modern 
capitalism relies on ingenuity. It cannot be economical if it cannot translate 
more into less—more energy use into less energy use, more physical labour 
into less physical labour. The crux of the matter is that ingenuity relies on 
thinking. Yet modern education encourages learning not thinking. It 
lionizes the acquisition of knowledge rather than its production. It is not a 
cradle of thought experiments. It does not induce analogical power. It does 
little for analogical reasoning. It contributes little to problem solving. 
We see the outward symptoms of this identified by Kyung Hee Kim 
(2010) in a re-analysis of some 300,000 Torrance test scores administered 
by the US-based Scholastic Testing Service over five decades. The 
research revealed these creativity test scores, which previously had risen, 
stopped rising in 1990. They experienced a statistically-significant decline 
after that turning-point. Twenty years into the post-modern era, creativity 
scores had fallen off and some of the components of creativity tested for by 
the Torrance battery had begun to decline as far back as 1984. The post-
industrial knowledge society did manage to increase performance on IQ 
tests. But strikingly this occurred only in the low-performing IQ bands, 
only on visual tests, and not on logical or mathematical tests. In other 
words this was solely an effect of the repeated exposure of low-intelligence 
cohorts to the tsunami of post-modern visual intensity and visual-kinetic 
screen culture (Bauerlin, 2008).   
The destruction of thinking due to the focus on learning is evident 
across the board. The great thinking disciplines of philosophy, physics and 
mathematics shrank to tiny sizes in contemporary universities after 1970. 
These were the traditional power-houses of intellectual creation. Yet they 
were dwarfed by the explosion of business studies and media studies and 
innumerable other “studies” that offered the acquisition of knowledge in 
place of the challenge of thinking. Today knowledge is so easily available 
on the Internet that people now talk about replacing universities with 
various online learning options.  Universities still have a trump card. They 
offer formal qualifications. These require an institutionalised course of 
study. But the troubling aspect of the mass university forged by the 
knowledge society is that a typical student undertaking a typical degree 
learns very little (Arum & Roska, 2011). The learning obsession of the 
larger society in fact has led to minimal learning in practice and often a lot 
of ignorance. Qualifications are mostly now meaningless. In 1970, 1-in-100 
taxi drivers and 2-in-100 fire fighters in the United States had a college 
degree; now 15-in-100 does (Vedder, Denhart & Robe, 2013).  
The cumulative result of all of this is a slow downward slide of human 
discovery and ingenuity (Murphy, 2010, 2013).
 
At the same time we have 
seen the equal and opposite bureaucratisation of society. The qualification 
fetish of post-industrial societies was a symptom of societies that created 
employment by expanding private and public bureaucracies. This was the 
answer to the underlying weakness of their political economy. Knowledge 
equated qualifications equated a bureaucratic process of hiring that judged 
applicants’ suitability for employment in terms of their formal 
qualifications. In principle qualifications signify knowledge that signifies 
expertise. In truth, the average contemporary qualification signifies 
virtually no knowledge and is a parody of expertise. The median university 
graduate today struggles to write a business letter that a fourteen year-old 
in high school in 1950 would have done competently. But this is not the 
worst of it. For it is not knowledge per se but thinking—and all the aspects 
of creation, originality, initiative, and reason that accompany thinking—
that education has deserted.  
Until 1970, the philosophy of education was a prominent stream in 
faculties of education in universities. From its crucible came works like 
Stanley I. Benn and Richard Stanley Peters’ Social principles and the 
democratic state (1959). Today the philosophy of education has been 
marginalised. This is indicative of a larger trend that has ostracised 
philosophical thinking in the broadest sense in favour of “studies” that at 
best produce an archival mind but at worst produce outright ignorance. The 
old relation between education, politics and philosophy has been shattered. 
The consequence of this is that the newer relation of politics and 
economics, in which the two were combined into political economy, is now 
under pressure. 
A successful modern political economy is not a knowledge economy. It 
is a thinking economy. It is driven by the innovation and creation that is a 
product of thinking. The French political economist J-B Say (1803) made 
the immortal observation that supply creates demand. In a modern 
economy, demand will eventually dip and will only rise again when 
ingenious entrepreneurs bring an interesting new generation of goods or 
services to market. That requires a chain of creation that is propelled by 
thinking.  
J.M. Keynes premised his own economic theory on denying Say’s 
postulate and inverting it. For Keynes, demand creates supply. The post-
industrial society drew heavily on Keynesian inspiration. The typical 
Keynesian modus operandi is to spend money on bureaucracies and 
subsidies so as to stimulate demand for goods and services in order to 
generate economic activity. This doesn’t work. Without Say’s supply, that 
is without the adventive goods and services that inspire consumers anew, 
demand that has declined will remain sluggish. The inspiration for supply 
comes from thought. When it worked, old-fashioned education prodded, 
stirred and stimulated thinking. This is the idea of education as it 
percolated its way down from Plato. This is not to say that only philosophy 
can inspire thinking. Art does it also. Cosmology, physics, mathematics, 
history—each of these does it as well. They do it because they force us to 
address mysteries, enigmas, puzzles and problems. No one today has a 
good explanation of the Cambrian explosion in natural history. All existing 
explanations are wanting. That suggests the need for a powerful analogy to 
be put on the table like Newton’s apple-orb. Political economies are not so 
different.   
The mathematician Alan Turing’s 1937 metaphors of the computing 
machine, symbols, memory, 0-1, instructions, writing, scanning, storage 
tape, printing, state of mind, and so on, provided the conceptual design of 
the intelligent machine—the modern stored-program computer. 1997, sixty 
years later, was the high-point of the economy that computing spawned. 
The computer proved to be the supply that created the demand that drove 
the post-industrial economy in its most ebullient moments. Yet it never did 
so to the degree that the passenger-train or the automobile had done. 
Perhaps this was because the metaphor of the knowledge society was 
misleading in a crucial way. The computer processed information and 
stored knowledge. The computer’s archival and retrieval capacities (in a 
way) exceeded its computational capacity in the end. The storage of 
knowledge is not however knowledge, no matter how effective the storage 
system is. In turn, knowledge does not capture adequately what a figure 
like Turing does. Knowledge is acquired, disseminated, and distributed. 
Someone like Turing in contrast creates this knowledge. The act of creation 
is a function of thinking. In the wake of the thinker, the knowledge that has 
been created is replicated, amended, conveyed, disputed, and 
communicated. But it is the relatively rare act of creation that sets all of 
this in motion. Creation is the unmoved mover of the dissemination-
imperative of knowledge.  
What makes or breaks political economies is the rate of creation. The 
creation of ideas is always relatively rare but it also varies across time. 
Some eras are more productive than others. Great political economies 
require fertile crucibles of creation. In its own collective mind, the post-
industrial age was a great political economy. Its self-image was one of 
ceaseless creation. But that self-image was false. The great economic 
downturn that began in 2008 showed effectively that the political economy 
of the post-industrial age lacked the vigour that it thought it had.  
The judgement of the entrepreneur and the co-founder of Pay Pal, Peter 
Theil, is correct.
1 
The innovative power of the forty years of the post-
industrial era was poor, computers aside. The era proclaimed itself a great 
success many times over. History now is beginning to judge it to have been 
a failure in many respects. Lack of innovation was the outward face of an 
inward lack of thinking that the era imposed upon itself. It confused 
thinking with learning, and learning with bureaucratised universities and 
programmed school curriculums. More often than not it confused 
innovation with the massive expansion of regulation.  
It is a good time now to reverse this. It is a good time to be old-
fashioned again. It is time to bring back the timeless. It is time to step out 
of the time stream of our own time and reinvent education. At the primary 
and secondary level, we need education (once again) to form character. We 
need students who are tough, persistent, and hard working. At the tertiary 
level, we need (once again) an education that turns its gaze away from the 
anaemic world of “studies” and back to the grandeur of philosophy, politics 





1. Peter Theil, Co-founder of Pay Pal. Interviewer Peter Robinson/Uncommon 
Knowledge, Hoover Institute, Stanford University, September 13, 2003. 
Peter Robinson: “Peter Theil, in remarks to the International Students for 
Liberty, I quote you:   
‘How much technological progress is actually happening? Is it getting faster and 
faster or is it actually decelerating and in some ways slowing down a great deal? 
The basic conclusion that I’ve reached is that outside a few areas we’ve had very 
little innovation in 40 years.’ Peter, forty years has taken us from the Ford Pinto to 
the Google Driverless vehicle, explain yourself. 
Peter Theil: “Well, if you look at the last forty years we have had tremendous 
progress in computers and very little progress just about everywhere else. … The 
most straightforward way to measure how fast we are moving is literally how fast 
are we moving? And travel speed has gotten faster century after century, decade 
after decade; we had faster sail boats in the nineteenth century, faster trains, then 
faster cars, faster airplanes. It culminated with the Concorde which was 
decommissioned in 2003 and today if you include low-tech airport security systems 
we are back to travel speeds circa 1960. In energy, there has been a massive failure 
of innovation which is reflected by the fact that oil prices and energy costs still have 
not recovered from the oil shocks of the 1970s. In inflation-adjusted dollars it costs 
as much as it did at the end of the Carter years today. 
Peter Robinson: Despite fracking… 
Peter Theil: Despite fracking. Without fracking it would be even worse. But 
despite fracking we are basically in a Carter-age energy crisis. You look at bio-
technology. We probably have about as third as many drugs being approved by the 
FDA per year as were being approved twenty years ago. You can go through sector 
after sector and say the technology has not lived up to its hopes. We can certainly 
hope that it is going to accelerate and we are on the cusp of a new golden age which 
is what we are constantly being promised but I think after forty years of hype and 
failed expectations, the burden of proof has shifted very much towards those who 
claim that we are about to see a lot more happen. And I think that this slow-down of 
course is reflected in the economic data. We have had generally stagnant wages 
since 1973. Median wages have been stagnant and mean wages are up maybe 22%, 
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